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This paper uses regional variation in labor markets, the industry structure and the educational 
system to explain the training decisions of firms. Using a representative firm-level data set, 
the results show that firms are less likely to offer training if the number of competing firms 
situated in the same geographical area is high. Furthermore, the supply of potential 
apprentices affects the training decision positively through an improved matching process. In 
addition, the expected ability of apprentices also has a positive impact, whereas a more 
developed system of full-time schooling options for school leavers reduces the likelihood of a 
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Apprenticeship training is believed to be a very eﬃcient form of training, providing skills to
young people, such that they have less problems in the transition into the labor market, e.g.
OECD (2000).1 The precondition for a successfully operating apprenticeship training system
is, however, that there is a suﬃciently high number of ﬁrms willing to train young people. The
factors inﬂuencing the willingness of ﬁrms to train have been analyzed in a limited number of
empirical studies. This study adds to the existing literature by analyzing the ﬁrms training
decision with the help of data on regional labor market conditions and the structure of the
regional education system.
This paper contributes to the training literature in diﬀerent ways. Firstly, regional variance
in the data is used within one national training system. This is an advantage, because local
eﬀects on the training decision can be captured, which would not be possible if one performs
an analysis on the national level. Furthermore, unobserved time eﬀects, that would almost
certainly be present in a longitudinal study, can be avoided. Secondly, this study diﬀers from
the few existing studies using data on a regional level, e.g. Brunello and de Paola (2004),
Brunello and Gambarotto (2004) or Niederalt (2005), by using travel distances rather than
political borders in deﬁning the regional area. Thirdly, a representative ﬁrm-level data set is
at our disposal that has been designed explicitly to analyze questions related to the training
decision of ﬁrms. This enables us to make use of detailed information that are relevant in this
context, such as variables including the number of skilled workers in the training profession of
(potential) apprentices as well as the retention and quit rates of apprentices in training ﬁrms.
Two main questions will be addressed in this paper. Firstly, the eﬀect that the possibility
of trained workers quitting after graduation has on the training decision is analyzed with
information about the local industry structure. And secondly, we analyze the impact of the
ability of potential apprentices on the training decision by using diﬀerent proxy variables,
which also contributes to the existing literature. Both sets of information; industry structure
and the supply of school-leavers, show a large degree of regional variation and are therefore
suited to be used in an inter-regional comparison.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy describes the Swiss apprenticeship
system. Section 3 discusses the theory on ﬁrm training and presents the empirical hypotheses
in the framework of a theoretical model. Section 4 introduces the data and the sample design.
In Section 5, the training probability of ﬁrms is estimated and the results are discussed.
Section 6 concludes.
1There is evidence that the apprenticeship training is even eﬃcient in countries, where this form of training
has a lesser tradition, see e.g. Bonnal et al. (2002)
22 The apprenticeship system in Switzerland
The apprenticeship system is still the backbone of the upper secondary level educational
system in German speaking countries. In Switzerland, about 60 percent of school leavers
choose an apprenticeship training program each year. The so called ”dual-education”provides
them with formal and on-the-job training within their ﬁrm, and one to two days of formal
schooling in a vocational school. The two main types of apprenticeship training programs
last either three or four years. As an alternative to the apprenticeship training, school-leavers
could also opt for full-time education at upper secondary level. Almost half of the remaining 40
percent of young people who do not choose an apprenticeship program attend grammar school
(Gymnasium), which prepares them for university and a more academic career. Although one
of the virtues of the apprenticeship system is its inclusiveness for not so academically prone
school leavers (Switzerland has one of the lowest percentages of the over-16 population not
having attended any form of non-compulsory schooling in the OECD), apprentices can qualify
for further education at the tertiary level. The proportion of apprentices continuing their
education at the tertiary level has steadily risen over the last decade. From the perspective
of an individual educational career, an apprenticeship training is therefore in no way a dead
end road.
Apprentices graduate with a diploma recognized throughout Switzerland attesting their
professional qualiﬁcation. The national certiﬁcation and the substantial share of formal educa-
tion during the training program gives the apprentices a guarantee for vertical and horizontal
mobility after they graduate. The quality of the training provided in Switzerland is recognized
internationally as meeting the highest standards. International comparisons show, in terms
of scholastic and professional qualiﬁcations, that Swiss apprentices are more than a match for
their upper secondary level peers attending school full-time (Bierhoﬀ and Prais, 1997).
The employment period ends automatically on completion of training. Any extension of
the employment period must be negotiated in a separate contract. Mobility is fairly high
among young people who complete their apprenticeship, with only 36 percent still working at
their original training site one year later (Schweri et al., 2003).2
3 Theory
In this section, the hypotheses and the choice of empirical variables will be described. We
begin by brieﬂy discussing the implications of the human capital theory and its reﬁnements
on the decision of ﬁrms to train apprentices. Then the question of how the expectations
of ﬁrms about the ability of apprentices inﬂuences the training decision will be addressed.
Subsequently, the arguments will be presented in a more formal manner, following the model
2In Germany, the corresponding ﬁgure is closer to 70 percent, see Winkelmann (1996) or Euwals and
Winkelmann (2002).
3of Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) and extending it to allow for interregional variations in labor
market conditions and educational systems.
3.1 Competitive vs. frictional labor markets
According to the classical human capital theory, ﬁrms will not pay for general training (Becker,
1964). The recent training literature, however, has focused on the reasons why ﬁrms might
pay for general training of their workers, which is a frequently observed phenomena and in
contradiction to the human capital theory. The main result of this literature states that a
ﬁrm is willing to pay for general training, if there is a positive probability that the apprentice
will remain within the ﬁrm after the training period, and that he will accept a wage below his
productivity, at least for some time. The necessary condition for this to happen, is that there
are frictions on the labor market. Frictions give the training ﬁrms enough monopsony power
to keep their trainees from switching to a competitor, even if the training ﬁrm is paying a wage
below the trainees’ productivity. In addition, the diﬀerence between wage and productivity
must be higher for skilled workers than for unskilled workers [Acemoglu and Pischke (1998,
1999) refer to this as compressed wage structure], otherwise ﬁrms would still not have an
incentive to invest in training their workforce. Compressed wage structure occurs if there
are either search costs, asymmetric information, ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, eﬃciency wages,
minimum wages or other wage ﬂoors. Although a compressed wage structure induces ﬁrms to
pay for general training, there will still be under-investment because not all returns to training
are internalized. Stevens (1994) also shows that if the trained skills are transferable, there
will be externalities leading to under-investment in training. For a comprehensive summary
of the literature on ﬁrm training see Leuven (2005).
The labor market in Switzerland is considered to be rather competitive by international
standards. Hence, one would expect that the costs of an apprenticeship training program
would have to be borne by the apprentices themselves in order for ﬁrms to provide training.
Consistent with this hypothesis, a Swiss survey shows that on average, an apprenticeship
program results in a net proﬁt for the training ﬁrm (Wolter and Schweri, 2002). In other
words, the productive contribution of an average apprentice is high enough to cover the
company’s training expenses and the salary of the apprentice. Hence, the possibility to cover
all training expenses already within the contract period of the apprenticeship program is a
necessary condition for ﬁrms to oﬀer training posts in the context of a highly competitive
labor market.3 However, not all ﬁrms have the structure which would guarantee that their
expenses were covered if they would decide to train apprentices. Wolter et al. (2006) show
that diﬀerences in the expected net costs of training during the training period can explain
why a great number of ﬁrms decide not to train apprentices. Finally, Muehlemann et al.
3Consistently with these ﬁndings for Switzerland, research in Germany, where labor market frictions are
high, has shown that on average training ﬁrms have signiﬁcant net costs after training (Beicht et al., 2004)
4(2005) show that the elasticity with which ﬁrms react to the expected net costs of training
is substantial for the training decision, yet, the oﬀer of apprenticeship positions by training
ﬁrms would not be increased by a marginal reduction in the net costs of training.
Despite the observation that an average apprenticeship program has no uncovered training
expenses at the end of the training period, about a third of training companies face positive net
costs after an apprentice has graduated. Therefore, at least a part of the training companies
must be able to use frictions in the labor market to recoup their training expenses. The
hypothesis tested in this paper is that within a region, a greater number of ﬁrms in the same
industry will lower the likelihood of a ﬁrm to train apprentices. We argue that an increasing
number of competitors that are geographically close will increase the probability that the
trained workers will leave the training company.4 Reason being the threat that the training
company can loose its trained workers, the training companies will have a lower probability
to make a gain by paying wages below productivity once the training is completed.
Overall, ﬁrms only oﬀer apprenticeship positions if it is already proﬁtable during the
training period, or if they are able to recoup their investments after the training period.
3.2 The expected ability of apprentices
The expected ability of apprentices is of twofold interest for training companies. On the one
hand, more able school leavers will lower the net costs of training, because they need less
training hours to reach the required training levels. On the other hand, if a company decides
to employ an apprentice after training, and labor market frictions allow the company to pay
wages below productivity, the gain is higher in the case of more able workers (apprentices).
In line with these hypotheses, one would expect that the easier it is for a company to recruit
able school-leavers, the more likely it will decide to engage in training. Since we cannot
directly observe the ability of an apprentice, we will test three types of proxy variables. All
of them vary substantially between regions, should theoretically have an independent impact
on the training decision and therefore be suitable for our empirical analysis. For the ﬁrst
variable, we argue that the number of school-leavers (within a region) per company is a
proxy for the quality of the match between apprentices and training ﬁrms. If there are more
young people per ﬁrm, then a ﬁrm should also ﬁnd more suitable applicants to ﬁll their
training posts. Therefore, independent of the average quality of school leavers in a region,
the number of school leavers per ﬁrm in a region should increase the quality of the match.
Secondly, PISA tests (OECD, 2002, 2004) have shown that pupils with a foreign mother
tongue are on average less qualiﬁed than native speakers. As a proxy for this eﬀect, the share
of pupils of foreign nationality in the region is used to capture the average quality of potential
apprentices. Thirdly, the structure of the education system at an upper secondary level is
4Franz and Zimmermann (2002) showed for Germany that outside options have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
the probability that apprentices leave the training company after the apprenticeship period.
5taken into account. It is assumed that the existence of a well developed full-time school
system in the region will attract the more able school leavers into these forms of education
and detract them from an apprenticeship training. Full-time schooling programs require a
costly infrastructure, thus they are regionally concentrated, and not all pupils have the same
access to these programs because they might live in more secluded region. Furthermore,
because the infrastructure cannot be adjusted at will in the short run, there are ﬂuctuations
in the admission standards due to demographic changes. In times where many young people
ﬁnish compulsory school at the same time, admission standards rise because the schools have
a limited number of classrooms and teachers available. On the contrary, if the number of
school leavers is low, then it will be easier to enroll in a full-time program, since the school
might not want to lay oﬀ teachers or have many empty classrooms. Furthermore, because the
academically oriented programs (grammar schools) at upper secondary level oﬀer a high social
prestige, these programs are generally preferred to apprenticeship programs (at least by the
parents of school leavers). One can assume that if the infrastructure for full-time schooling
in a region is well developed, a training ﬁrm will have a smaller pool of able applicants for an
apprenticeship program. Consequently, full-time schooling programs will have an exogenous
aﬀect on the ﬁrms training decision. As a proxy for the size of the full-time schooling oﬀer in
a region, we use the share of school-leavers that opted for grammar schools in 1995.5
3.3 The Model
The model consists of two periods. Firms are risk neutral and they can hire workers at the
beginning of either period. Also, there are constant returns to scale in the production process
and there is no discounting between the two periods. The amount of training oﬀered to the
hired apprentices is t and, like the ﬁrms, apprentices are assumed to be risk neutral and do
not discount between periods. They are working productively in the ﬁrms and produce a
standardized output of zero in the training period. The output during the second period is
y = α(t)η, where α(t) is deﬁned as general human capital and η as worker’s ability. Since we
distinguish between geographic labor markets r, we allow the distribution of the apprentices
ability to be diﬀerent in each region, based on our arguments in the preceding section. Hence,
the distribution of ability is Fr(η).
During the ﬁrst period, ﬁrms incur training costs t and pay the apprentice a wage W.
At the end of the ﬁrst period, the ﬁrm learns about the ability η of each worker, which is
independent of training, and oﬀers a post-training wage w(t). If the workers quits, he will
receive an outside wage v(t) in any other ﬁrm. Workers exogenously quit due to a disutility
shock θr, which can be interpreted as disutility to stay with the ﬁrm. However, if an apprentice
would like to quit because of that shock, he might incur mobility costs if ﬁnding a new job
5As the ﬁrm survey covers training and non-training ﬁrms at the end of the year 2000, one can rule out the
possibility that the number of grammar school students in 1995 might be endogenous.
6requires to change the place of residence. The relevant size of θr is therefore not only the
disutility from staying with the ﬁrm but also includes the disutility from moving to another
ﬁrm. The probability of workers receiving such a shock is λ, which does not diﬀer between
regions, but the probability distribution of Gr(θ) is regionally diﬀerent.6 Hence, a higher θr
will induce more exogenous quits (1). Consequently, higher quits in a region lead to lower
expected proﬁts of training apprentices and thus a lower training probability.
If the ability level is observed, the outcome is the Becker model. Workers who quit get paid
according to their marginal product which, depends on ability η, so the salary is v(t) = α(t)η.
Every apprentice will quit if the ﬁrm does not oﬀer a wage v(t). As a result, the worker reaps
all the beneﬁts yet also pays for the training costs. If W is constrained to be nonnegative,
there will be no training, and t0 = 0. On the other hand, if W is unconstrained, then the ﬁrst
best amount of training is tc = argmax
R
ηα(t)dF(η) − t and the training wage is W = −tc.
The probability that a worker with training t quits is qr[w(t),v(t)], and he will receive an
outside wage v(t). If the worker remains within the ﬁrm, the wage oﬀered is w(t), but he will
suﬀer from disutility θr with probability λ. It is optimal to quit if v(t) − w(t) + θr ≥ 0. The
probability of quitting is therefore
qr[w(t),v(t)] = λ[1 − Gr[w(t) − v(t)]] (1)
Since the ﬁrm has to pay the same wage to all remaining workers with the same apprenticeship
certiﬁcate, the ﬁrm will lay oﬀ all workers below a certain skill level ˆ η(t). Given the minimal
skill level ˆ η(t), below which workers would be laid oﬀ, a higher ability of apprentices increases
the chances that a ﬁrm will keep an apprentice as a worker. In addition, the higher the
expected ability, the higher the diﬀerence between the workers productivity and his salary.
Therefore, all variables in our empirical model that capture regional diﬀerences in the expected
ability of apprentices will have an impact on the training intensity in a region. Since ﬁrms
oﬀers W ﬁrst, and then decide on the amount of training, retention and wage policies, the
proﬁt maximization problem can be written as:
max
w(t),ˆ η(t),t
Π = [1 − qr[w(t),v(t)]]
∞ Z
ˆ η(t)
[α(t)η − w(t)]dFr(η) − t − W (2)





6The probability that a worker has to change the place of residence is much lower in regions with many
ﬁrms in the particular industry. Therefore, the probability that θr is large, is smaller in a more secluded
region with few ﬁrms, because a change the workplace is more likely to require a change of residence, which in
turn reduces the net disutility of staying with the training ﬁrm. Consequently, exogenous quits should be an
increasing function of the number of ﬁrms.









[α′(t∗)η − v′(t∗)]dFr(η) = 1 (5)
For the equilibrium outcome, proﬁts Π = 0. Therefore,
W∗ = max{0;[1 − q[w∗(t∗),v(t∗)]]
∞ Z
ˆ η∗(t∗)
[α(t∗)η − w∗(t∗)]dFr(η) − t∗}. (6)
Hence, outside wages are
v(t) =




q[w∗(t),v(t)] + [1 − q[w∗(t),v(t)]]Fr( ˆ η∗(t))
(7)
Summing up the theoretical implications of the model, both the quit rate of apprentices,
which is inﬂuenced by the number of ﬁrms within a region, and the expected ability of
apprentices, which depends on the quality of the matching between applicants and ﬁrms, the
average ability of school-leavers and the alternative schooling options for school-leavers, have
an impact on the training decisions of ﬁrms.
4 Data
4.1 Survey design and data
The data used here is from a representative survey conducted in Swiss ﬁrms in the year 2001
by the Center for Research in Economics of Education at the University of Berne and the
Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce.7 The original data set contains 2352 training ﬁrms and 2230
non-training ﬁrms, but ﬁrms that cannot make independent decisions about training, because
they are part of a larger enterprize were excluded.8 Furthermore, ﬁrms that operate in the
whole country and use a centralized training scheme were excluded from the sample. The
ﬁnal data set used in this paper has a total of 4090 ﬁrms. Detailed data on the number of
workers, skilled workers in the (potential) training profession, training profession, retention
and quit rates of apprentices and the personnel situation is available at the ﬁrm level.
7For details on the survey characteristics see (Wolter and Schweri, 2002)
8The results do not change if public ﬁrms are excluded from the sample.
84.2 Regional labor markets
We have constructed regional labor markets to accommodate the geographic structure of
Switzerland. Regions were deﬁned as follows: The largest Swiss cities were taken as centers
of each region. All towns and communes that could be reached within half an hour by car
constitute the area of a region.9 In total, there are 67 diﬀerent regions that cover all of the
country; especially in densely populated areas, the regions can be overlapping. This deﬁnition
of a region captures the economic and geographic reality in a much better way than using
political and administrative entities, such as cantons or districts. For each region, all relevant
data was collected at the community level, then aggregated to the regional level and ﬁnally
matched to our data set. The variables include the number of ﬁrms within an industry, the
population size by age group, the number of pupils and their origin as well as the number of
students on diﬀerent levels of secondary education. The descriptives of the regional data can
be found in the appendix (Table 4).
5 Econometric models and empirical analysis
In order to estimate the eﬀect of our variables of interest on the training decision, a probit
model was used. The variables on the regional level inﬂuence all companies within a region
in the same way. Therefore, the variance of variables on the regional level should be treated
diﬀerently than the variance of the ﬁrm-level data. Hence, the standard errors are adjusted
for clustering to accommodate this type of data structure.
5.1 Estimation of the eﬀects on the training decision
We assume that the decision to oﬀer training depends on ﬁrm characteristics j and on some
regional variables r. Let
yjr =
(
1 if ﬁrm j trains
0 if ﬁrm j does not train
(8)
then the probability that a ﬁrm oﬀers training is
P(yjr = 1|xjr) = P(yjr∗ > 0|xjr) = Φ(xjrβ),j = 1,...,4090;r = 1,...67. (9)
We use the following probit regression model for the training decision:
yir = 1[x′
jrβjr + εjr < 0] (10)
where xir contains regional variables r concerning the number of ﬁrms in a certain industry,
the percentage of young people of the whole population, the percentage of young people in
9To measure the travel time, we used the software ”Microsoft Autoroute 2005”
9high school and the percentage of foreign pupils in elementary school. As well, there are
variables on the ﬁrms level i about the ﬁrm size, number of skilled workers in the training
profession, ﬁrm ownership, industry, training profession and a variable indicating whether the
ﬁrm has diﬃculties to recruit skilled workers on the external labor market.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 The inﬂuence of the number of ﬁrms within a region
The results show that the number of ﬁrms in a regional labor market has a signiﬁcant and
negative eﬀect on the provision of training. The ﬁrm eﬀect is largest when we exclude the
other regional variables we have available (Model 1). The training decision of ﬁrms reacts to
the number of ﬁrms per industry in a region with an elasticity of -0.19.10 In other words,
the eﬀect of a 10% increase in the number of ﬁrms in the region and industry reduces the
training probability by 1.9%.11 Once the number of young people and the schooling variables
are introduced, the ﬁrm eﬀect becomes smaller but remains negative and signiﬁcant. In our
preferred speciﬁcation (Model 4), an increase in the number of ﬁrms by 10% reduces the
training probability by 1%. Therefore it can be argued that the outside options for workers
are important for the ﬁrm’s training decision, at least at the regional level. Our results are in
line with the ﬁndings of Harhoﬀ and Kane (1997), Brunello and de Paola (2004), Brunello and
Gambarotto (2004). A further indication that the number of ﬁrms within a region inﬂuences
the training decision can be found by analyzing only the training ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that a ﬁrm
is more likely to suﬀer from a high exogenous quit rate if there are more ﬁrms in the same
industry within a region; although the eﬀect is only marginally signiﬁcant, an increase in the
number of ﬁrms by 10% increases the probability of a high exogenous quit rate by 2 percentage
points (Table 2).12
5.2.2 The inﬂuence of the ﬁrm’s expected ability of apprentices
As discussed in section 3.2, the eﬀect of the ability of apprentices on the ﬁrm behavior cannot
be observed directly. Instead, proxy variables for the ﬁrms expectations about the ability of
potential apprentices were used. We ﬁnd that these variables are important determinants of
a ﬁrm’s decision process. The size of the cohort, the quality of pupils and the structure of
the education system inﬂuence the training decisions of ﬁrms signiﬁcantly.
10All elasticities reported in the text are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. For reasons of space they are not
shown speciﬁcally in table 1.
11The average training probability in the sample is 29.8%, see also table 3 in the appendix.
12The quit rate within a ﬁrm is a binary variable deﬁned to be high, if at least half of the trained apprentices
quit the ﬁrm after training, despite the ﬁrm oﬀered them a contract as a skilled worker.
10Table 1: Probit regression: Training decision of ﬁrms
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Number of ﬁrms in the region (in ’000) -0.121** -0.107** -0.094** -0.066**
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.022)
Number of young people per ﬁrm (in ’000) 0.485** 0.519** 0.560**
0.111 0.110 0.113
Percentage of young people with college degree -1.894** -1.183*
0.608 0.568
High rate of foreigners in elementary school -0.168*
0.075
Large metropolitan area -0.069
0.073
1-4 employees -0.440** -0.352* -0.35* -0.376*
(0.159) (0.161) (0.162) (0.160)
5-9 employees -0.270 -0.182 -0.177 -0.200
(0.168) (0.170) (0.171) (0.170)
10-49 employees -0.231 -0.147 -0.138 -0.160
(0.137) (0.136) (0.136) (0.134)
50-99 employees -0.060 -0.063 -0.049 -0.076
(0.197) (0.197) (0.197) (0.197)
Log number of skilled workers 0.461** 0.463** 0.463** 0.461**
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
French part of Switzerland -0.245** -0.23** -0.120 -0.097
(0.068) (0.068) (0.072) (0.068)
Italian part of Switzerland -0.368 -0.327 0.029 -0.050
(0.210) (0.209) (0.242) (0.241)
Foreign-owned ﬁrm -0.608** -0.614** -0.606** -0.605**
(0.150) (0.152) (0.154) (0.153)
Diﬃculties to ﬁnd skilled workers on labor market 0.282** 0.279* 0.28** 0.277**
(0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052)
Intercept -0.576** -0.714** -0.514* -0.489*
(0.202) (0.208) (0.224) (0.224)
Job & Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4090 4090 4090 4090
Log-likelihood -2086.573 -2075.034 -2069.438 -2062.791
Signiﬁcance levels : ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering. Number of clusters: 67
1
1First, the number of young people per ﬁrms within a region and industry has a signiﬁcant
and positive eﬀect on training. If the number of young people increases by 10%, then the
training probability of a ﬁrm increases by 0.8% (Model 4). The reason why the number of
young people has a separate eﬀect on the training decision lies in the improved matching
between ﬁrms and candidates. If a ﬁrm has a larger pool of applicants, then it is more likely
that there will be somebody suitable amongst those who apply for an apprenticeship position.
Second, an increase in the percentage of foreign children in elementary schools reduces
the training provision of ﬁrms. If a ﬁrm is located within a region with more than 20% of
foreigners in elementary schools, then the training probability is reduced by 5.6 percentage
points (Model 4). This reﬂects the fact that ﬁrms expect higher training costs because of
lower abilities of the average potential apprentice, which is in line with the results from
student achievement tests, e.g. OECD (2002, 2004).
Third, ﬁrms are less likely to oﬀer training in regions with a well developed full-time school
system at the upper secondary level. Again, ﬁrms expect the ability of an average applicant
to be lower, because the more able school leavers are more likely to opt for the full-time
schooling instead of a (sophisticated) apprenticeship training program. The results show that
an increase in the ratio of the high school enrollment rate by 10 percentage points decreases
the training probability by 3.8 percentage points.
In conclusion, it can be shown that the ﬁrm’s expectations about the ability of apprentices
inﬂuences their training decision. The behavior of training ﬁrms (Table 2) also seems to be
consistent with the model, which predicts that a ﬁrm only keeps an apprentice as a skilled
worker if the ability is above a minimum threshold ˆ η∗. The variable used to approximate
ability is the average relative productivity of the ﬁrm’s apprentices in the last year of the
training program. The results show that the lower the relative productivity, the higher the
likelihood that a ﬁrm lays oﬀ their apprentices after training.13
The eﬀects of the ﬁrm-level variables are, after the inclusion of regional variables, similar
to previous studies, e.g. Wolter et al. (2006) or Muehlemann et al. (2005). The number of
skilled workers in the profession to be trained in a ﬁrm has a very strong and positive inﬂuence
on the training decision. The ﬁrm size has an additional impact; given the number of skilled
workers, small ﬁrms are still less likely to train apprentices. The reason for this behavior
could be that small ﬁrms face a higher uncertainty about the quality of an apprentice and
his quit behavior (small ﬁrms are usually the last in the chain when school leavers apply for
apprenticeship posts). At the same time, they are very often too small and too specialized
to provide all the required training lessons and content at reasonable costs. Firms in the
construction sector and the public administration are more likely to train apprentices.
The only important diﬀerence to the cited studies above is that the eﬀect of language
13The dependent variable ”high layoﬀs” is deﬁned as a binary variable with the value 1, if more than 50% of
apprentices are laid oﬀ within a ﬁrm.
12regions in Switzerland disappears, once we control for the structure of the education system.
It is exactly the more developed secondary school system in the French part of Switzerland
that is in competition with the dual education system. Due to the fact that a larger proportion
of more able students at age 15-16 continues a school-based education, the expected training
costs of an apprentice are higher in the French part and thus the average training probability
is lower.
Table 2: Probit regression: Quits and layoﬀs of apprentices after training
Dependant variable: High quits‡ High layoﬀs
Number of ﬁrms in the region (in ’000) 0.060†
(0.035)
Relative productivity in last year of training -0.335†
(0.179)
Training duration 3 years 0.227 0.635**
(0.198) (0.189)
Log number of skilled workers -0.195** 0.080
(0.056) (0.060)
1-4 employees -0.022 0.363
(0.265) (0.267)
5-9 employees -0.153 0.231
(0.233) (0.214)
10-49 employees -0.027 0.042
(0.169) (0.178)
50-99 employees -0.041 0.132
(0.176) (0.203)
Foreign-owned ﬁrm -0.169 0.027
(0.161) (0.199)
French part of Switzerland -0.069 0.038
(0.130) (0.134)




Job & Industry dummies Yes Yes
N 1718 1516
Log-likelihood -998.815 -966.296
Signiﬁcance levels: †:10% ∗:5% ∗∗:1%.
‡Standard errors adjusted for clustering. Number of clusters: 67.
136 Concluding remarks
The results described in this paper provide insights insofar that regional aspects of the labor
market and the educational system inﬂuence the training decision of ﬁrms. The factors singled
out in the analysis have several consequences for policy making.
The negative eﬀect of a high density of ﬁrms (of the same industry) on the likelihood to
train apprentices underlines the importance of regulations. Firms need to be able to train
apprentices in a cost eﬃcient manner if the labor markets are competitive. Otherwise, ﬁrms
will not engage in training, because the probability to recoup the training expenses after the
training period would be too low.
The variables related to the supply of potential apprentices have several implications.
Firstly, the quality of the school system directly impacts the cost-beneﬁt ratio of an appren-
ticeship program. Therefore, measures which improve the competencies of school leavers will
aﬀect the apprenticeship training system positively. Secondly, the importance of a high num-
ber of potential applicants for the training decision of ﬁrms indicates, that the current problem
of a fraction of school leavers to ﬁnd an apprenticeship post will not automatically be solved
due to future demographic changes. The predicted reduction in school leavers will result in a
lower number of applicants for an apprenticeship position per ﬁrm. Hence, the probability of
a good match between the ﬁrm and the apprentice will be lower, and thereby the likelihood
that a ﬁrm will oﬀer apprenticeship posts will be reduced. Finally, the public investments in
full-time schooling options at upper secondary level are - intentionally or not - a threat to the
dual apprenticeship training system. The more attractive and accessible full-time schooling
programs are, the more diﬃcult it will be for ﬁrms to ﬁnd apprentices with suﬃciently high
competencies. Therefore, even schooling programs that were initially created to solve cyclical
imbalances on the apprenticeship market can cause the destruction of apprenticeship posts in
the long run.
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167 Appendix
Table 3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Training ﬁrm 0.298 0.458 4090
Number of ﬁrms in the region (in ’000) 1.234 1.496 4090
Number of young people per ﬁrm (in ’000) 0.116 0.378 4090
Large metropolitan area 0.557 0.497 4090
Percentage of young people with college degree 0.141 0.057 4090
High rate of foreigners in elementary school 0.653 0.476 4090
High quit rate 0.349 0.477 1718
High retention rate 0.832 1.888 1874
High layoﬀ rate 0.735 1.314 1874
Training duration 3 years 0.615 0.487 3861
Training duration 4 years 0.26 0.439 3861
1-4 employees 0.324 0.468 4090
5-9 employees 0.398 0.49 4090
10-49 employees 0.23 0.421 4090
50-99 employees 0.025 0.157 4090
> 100 employees 0.021 0.145 4090
Log number of skilled workers 0.972 0.901 4090
French part of Switzerland 0.228 0.42 4090
Italian part of Switzerland 0.03 0.172 4090
Construction sector 0.112 0.316 4090
Industrial sector 0.128 0.334 4090
Public sector 0.062 0.241 4090
Foreign-owned ﬁrm 0.11 0.313 4090
Diﬃculties to ﬁnd skilled workers on labor market 0.398 0.489 4090
Commercial employee 0.199 0.399 4090
Polymechanics technician 0.018 0.132 4090
IT specialist 0.027 0.161 4090
Cook 0.07 0.254 4090
Electromechanics technician 0.019 0.135 4090
Mason 0.024 0.152 4090
Architectural draftsperson 0.028 0.166 4090
Salesperson (2 years) 0.058 0.235 4090
Auto mechanic 0.019 0.137 4090
Carpenter 0.023 0.151 4090
Salesperson (3 years) 0.024 0.154 4090
Oﬃce worker 0.036 0.186 4090
Assistant in doctor’s oﬃce 0.021 0.142 4090
Structural draftsperson 0.01 0.097 4090
Hairdresser 0.016 0.125 4090
Automation technician 0.004 0.061 4090
Electronics technician 0.004 0.062 4090
17Table 4: Descriptives of regional variables
Region Training avg. pop. age 15-20 share population share foreign
yes/no per ﬁrm & industry in high school pupils > 0.2
1 0.160 53.145 0.293 1.000
2 0.192 32.010 0.171 0.000
3 0.271 62.234 0.046 0.000
4 0.036 110.956 0.264 1.000
5 0.290 7.760 0.198 0.000
6 0.184 41.499 0.132 1.000
7 0.408 131.486 0.142 0.000
8 0.306 75.118 0.070 1.000
9 0.510 119.304 0.091 0.000
10 0.374 85.572 0.098 0.000
11 0.402 74.129 0.079 0.000
12 0.243 257.718 0.279 1.000
13 0.257 51.985 0.182 1.000
14 0.480 178.746 0.161 1.000
15 0.429 73.119 0.118 0.000
16 0.511 291.014 0.118 0.000
17 0.283 73.646 0.107 0.000
18 0.268 63.971 0.300 1.000
19 0.252 72.230 0.118 0.000
20 0.197 63.889 0.137 1.000
21 0.214 138.116 0.166 1.000
22 0.292 159.682 0.105 0.000
23 0.209 106.217 0.161 1.000
24 0.354 81.003 0.200 1.000
25 0.266 44.078 0.162 1.000
26 0.357 86.007 0.088 0.000
27 0.342 241.410 0.160 1.000
28 0.596 261.747 0.122 1.000
29 0.635 74.005 0.044 0.000
30 0.177 37.896 0.316 1.000
31 0.136 75.358 0.357 1.000
32 0.476 92.031 0.117 0.000
33 0.464 201.821 0.107 0.000
34 0.314 92.602 0.100 1.000
18...continued from previous page
35 0.289 64.474 0.130 1.000
36 0.352 129.352 0.118 0.000
37 0.388 116.962 0.183 0.000
38 0.170 75.957 0.165 1.000
39 0.187 118.780 0.127 1.000
40 0.261 45.238 0.173 1.000
41 0.219 104.280 0.121 0.000
42 0.344 47.054 0.150 0.000
43 0.343 105.825 0.130 0.000
44 0.334 126.792 0.092 0.000
45 0.390 193.676 0.128 1.000
46 0.422 109.860 0.104 0.000
47 0.395 182.530 0.153 1.000
48 0.468 185.096 0.038 0.000
49 0.333 225.867 0.088 1.000
50 0.454 185.160 0.108 1.000
51 0.526 58.004 0.106 0.000
52 0.464 10.888 0.119 0.000
53 0.375 54.595 0.047 1.000
54 0.259 67.131 0.091 1.000
55 0.106 259.048 0.169 0.000
56 0.561 267.450 0.164 0.000
57 0.304 122.452 0.157 0.000
58 0.589 267.996 0.171 1.000
59 0.537 332.895 0.108 0.000
60 0.214 85.377 0.098 0.000
61 0.271 76.899 0.079 0.000
62 0.391 408.374 0.063 0.000
63 0.230 224.648 0.143 1.000
64 0.253 358.340 0.150 1.000
65 0.540 275.156 0.090 1.000
66 0.256 283.890 0.113 1.000
67 0.336 196.990 0.146 1.000
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